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Politics of Nonenforcement 
Zachary S. Price† 
Abstract 
Constitutional controversies over executive nonenforcement have 
emerged as a major theme of the Obama Presidency. Yet similar 
controversies arose in other recent administrations—and in past 
debates, the two political parties’ positions on this issue were often 
reversed. Building on previous work addressing constitutional principles 
that properly govern executive enforcement discretion, this brief 
symposium contribution reflects on these principles in light of our 
current, highly polarized politics. It does so in three ways. First, Part I 
provides historical perspective on current debates by describing major 
enforcement-related controversies from the Reagan and George W. 
Bush Administrations. Second, Part II proposes criteria for assessing 
how faithful an agency’s enforcement policy is to the agency’s 
underlying statutory mandate. As Part II explains, several qualities—
most importantly, transparency and clarity—that are generally 
considered virtues in administrative law are often counterproductive in 
the enforcement context. Finally, Part III tentatively explores possible 
practical, political implications of weakening norms of executive 
enforcement obligation. 
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Constitutional controversies over executive authority to decline 
enforcement of federal laws have emerged as a major theme of the 
Obama Presidency. The current administration has caused controversy 
with nonenforcement policies relating to marijuana, implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act, and immigration.1 Congressional Republicans 
seized on the issue as a means to attack a President whose policies they 
adamantly oppose.2 One rather ironic result is a lawsuit by the House 
of Representatives to compel enforcement of provisions in a statute (the 
Affordable Care Act) that House leaders denounce in the same breath 
as unconstitutional and even un-American.3 On immigration, 
Republican legislators have undertaken efforts to strip executive 
authority or leverage congressional appropriations power to induce 
executive changes.4 
Newcomers to separation-of-powers controversy might be surprised 
that in other recent administrations the two political parties’ positions 
on this very issue were reversed. As one component of a broader dereg-
ulatory effort, officials in the Reagan Administration dramatically re-
duced enforcement of legal requirements that they considered bad 
policy.5 At the same time, executive branch lawyers and allied scholars 
advanced legal theories—now partially reflected in Supreme Court case 
law6—to insulate such executive inaction from judicial reversal, based 
in part on a claimed inherent executive authority of enforcement discre-
tion.7 The two Bush administrations continued this pattern; if any-
thing, the George W. Bush Administration pursued a more determined 
 
1. For discussion of these policies, see infra Part I.C. 
2. Id. 
3. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, Case No. 14-cv-01967 
(D.D.C., compl. filed Nov. 21, 2014); H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong. (as 
passed by House, July 30, 2014) (authorizing lawsuit); John Boehner & 
Mitch McConnell, Now We Can Get Congress Going, Wall St. J., Nov. 
5, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-boehner-and-mitch-mcconnell 
-now-we-can-getcongress-going-1415232759 (calling the ACA “a hope-
lessly flawed law that Americans have never supported” and announcing 
Republican leaders’ renewed “commitment to repeal ObamaCare, which 
is hurting the job market along with Americans’ health care”). 
4. See, e.g., Preventing Executive Overreach on Immigration Act of 2014, 
H.R. 5759, 113th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 4, 2014) (proposed 
legislation to limit executive immigration relief). 
5. See infra Part I.A. 
6. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985) (holding that agency 
enforcement decisions are generally unreviewable under the APA). 
7. See infra Part I.A. 
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agenda of “deregulation through non-enforcement.”8 Then, as now, 
critics in Congress howled in protest, decrying executive actions as 
inconsistent with executive responsibility.9 
In this brief symposium contribution, I highlight this historical 
counterpoint as a vehicle for reflection on appropriate norms of 
executive conduct. Given intense political polarization and partisan 
disagreement over policy, selecting norms of executive obligation with 
respect to law enforcement requires stepping behind a veil of ignorance 
with respect to whether one’s own party will control Congress or the 
executive branch. The current political reality of divided government, 
intense partisan hostility, and legislative gridlock places pressure on the 
executive branch to address popular demands through executive action. 
At the same time, the scope and severity of existing laws, coupled with 
political contestation over the policy merits of many past statutes, has 
made nonenforcement a potentially significant form of executive action. 
Yet parallels between current and past examples demonstrate how 
forms of executive power claimed in one administration may be 
deployed to quite different policy ends during a future presidency. 
While this practical reality should give pause to both sides, it also dem-
onstrates that any objective theory of executive power should seek foun-
dations beyond the politics of the moment. 
In previous work, I have addressed constitutional principles govern-
ing executive enforcement discretion.10 The constitutional structure 
properly implies a default rule of limited executive enforcement discre-
tion, most centrally because the Take Care Clause of Article II imposes 
a duty on the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”11 While resource constraints on enforcement make more 
expansive discretion inevitable in many areas of modern regulation, the 
Constitution nonetheless supports a basic executive obligation to 
effectuate statutory policies rather than deliberately subverting them 
through nonenforcement. 
Without repeating my full constitutional argument, I add to it here 
in three ways. First, in Part I, I provide context for current debates by 
offering a brief (and fairly unsystematic) historical account of 
enforcement-related controversies from the Reagan, George W. Bush, 
and Obama Administrations. I focus on these three administrations 
because significant political controversies over executive 
nonenforcement arose during all of them and because the Reagan and 
Bush examples provide useful counterpoints to current debates 
 
8. Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 795, 796 (2010). For discussion of examples, see infra 
Part I.B. 
9. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
10. See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 673 (2014). 
11. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
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regarding the Obama Administration’s policies. Officials in the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations reduced enforcement in key areas of concern 
to their core constituents, including environmental, labor, and civil 
rights regulation. In several areas of core concern to his own 
constituents, President Obama has continued this pattern yet has done 
so (at least in the most controversial cases) through more overt and 
deliberate policies than his predecessors. 
In Part II, I draw from these recent examples from ideologically 
disparate administrations to propose criteria of faithful execution. 
Assuming, as I have argued, that executive agencies are duty-bound to 
enforce statutory policies, how might we assess their performance in 
doing so? In areas of regulation where resource constraints necessitate 
vast discretion, agencies must choose between a wide range of possible 
enforcement practices and policies. The degree to which those practices 
and policies accord with underlying statutory requirements will often 
be more a matter of mindset and degree than any sort of bright-line 
legal determination.12 Some criteria may nevertheless be identified, yet 
those criteria often run counter to conventional intuitions about best 
practices in other areas of administrative law. In particular, apart from 
the obvious measures of overall intensity of effort and success in 
inducing compliance, criteria of transparency, clarity, and central 
direction may be relevant—but often as vices rather than virtues. In 
the enforcement context, transparency enables evasion, clarity risks 
shifting the effective rule of law from the statute itself to the 
enforcement policy, and central direction invites political pressure on 
more neutral agency judgments. Thus, although some have advocated 
more transparent, definite, and centrally directed policies as a means of 
assuring greater public accountability, such policies may at times 
undermine the very value of agency fidelity to statutory requirements 
that administrative law generally seeks to maximize. 
In Part III, having framed possible criteria for faithful execution, I 
raise the question of how strong or weak the norm of executive 
enforcement responsibility should be. Building on my earlier, more for-
mal analysis of this question, I speculate here about practical, political 
consequences of eroding enforcement norms. In particular, I tentatively 
propose three possible reasons to prefer a strong norm of executive 
enforcement obligation. First, the durability of legislative achievements 
often depends on enforcement by future administrations with different 
policy preferences. Any further weakening of executive enforcement 
obligations may thus imperil important legislative victories for both 
sides. Second, to the extent Congress perceives executive policies as 
unexpected or illegitimate, broadened executive nonenforcement could 
heighten interbranch tensions and exacerbate political gridlock. Third, 
although the political dynamics surrounding each particular law may 
vary, in general extensive executive nonenforcement may weaken 
 
12. See Price, supra note 10, at 677, 755. 
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political pressures on Congress to conform laws to current public 
preferences. As recent examples illustrate, such executive action may 
provide an outlet for short-term political demands for change. Yet doing 
so may weaken the pressure on Congress to undertake more funda-
mental, long-term legal change. Insofar as that is true, maintaining a 
strong sense of the executive obligation to enforce laws, whether or not 
the President agrees with them, not only is more consistent with the 
formal constitutional structure but also might stand the best chance of 
giving us a sensible, responsive set of laws in the long run. 
I. Nonenforcement, Republican and Democrat 
The Constitution, of course, divides legislative and executive power. 
As the legislative branch of the federal government, Congress holds 
lawmaking power (subject to the President’s limited veto power).13 The 
President, as head of the executive branch, bears responsibility for 
executing acts of Congress, a responsibility reflected most directly in 
the President’s textually assigned duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”14 With respect to statutory enforcement, this 
division of responsibility means that Congress passes general laws that 
the executive branch enforces in particular cases subject to applicable 
requirements of judicial or administrative due process.15 
The separation of lawmaking and law-enforcing powers is a 
deliberate feature of the constitutional design. Indeed, the framers 
considered it an important protection for individual liberty.16 Yet this 
division of responsibility can give rise to friction, as members of 
Congress may feel the executive branch is dragging its feet in enforcing 
laws that Congress has adopted. The problem seems particularly 
pronounced in the post–New Deal (and particularly postwar) period. 
The scale of modern federal administration combined with resource 
constraints on enforcement of the many statutes Congress has passed 
over time makes extensive enforcement discretion a practical necessity 
 
13. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 7–8. 
14. Id. art. II, § 3. 
15. Modern administrative agencies, of course, combine functions of 
lawmaking and law enforcement, but in principle a parallel division 
between regulatory policy and enforcement of that policy obtains even in 
the agency context. In any event, I concentrate here on the paradigm case 
of executive enforcement of statutory requirements. 
16. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting Baron De Montesquieu) (“When the legis-
lative and executive powers are united in the same person or body . . . 
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner.”). 
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within the executive branch. One consequence is potential controversy 
over the exercise of that discretion.17 
Such friction may arise from differences between the constituencies 
that elect Congress and the President. Again, this source of friction is 
a deliberate feature of the constitutional structure. By design, Congress 
includes geographically distributed representation—two senators from 
each state in the Senate and representatives from specific geographic 
districts, allocated by state, in the House of Representatives.18 In 
contrast, the Electoral College selects the President. Although the Con-
stitution also allocates electors by state,19 in practice the President 
holds a more broadly national constituency. At present, many believe 
the national political landscape favors Democrats in presidential races, 
while the residential sorting of voters by party may (at least in 
combination with existing districting arrangements) give Republicans 
a natural advantage in the House of Representatives, if not also the 
Senate.20 This divergence, moreover, appears particularly pronounced 
in midterm elections, when core Democratic constituencies have tended 
to turn out in lower numbers.21 In the recent past, however, these 
relative advantages were reversed. Democrats controlled the House 
throughout the Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies; they 
controlled the Senate as well for roughly six of those twelve years.22  
17. For my elaboration of this historical argument, see Price, supra note 10, 
at 742–46. Relatedly, Sean Farhang argues that interbranch conflict and 
the “fragmented state structures” of the American polity have encouraged 
Congress to rely on private rather than public enforcement of statutory 
policies. Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation 
and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 5 (2010). I focus here on conflicts 
over public enforcement policy rather than the choice between public and 
private enforcement. 
18. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2–3; Id. amend. XVII; 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2012). 
19. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–21 (2012). 
20. See Aaron Blake, People Move to Places that Fit Their Politics. And It’s 
Helping Republicans, Wash. Post, Jun. 13, 2014, http://www.washing 
tonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/13/people-move-to-places-that-
fit-their-politics-and-its-helping-republicans/ (discussing the effect of 
“natural gerrymandering” based on a preference to live near those with 
similar political ideologies). 
21. See Aaron Blake, The Democrats’ Midterm Turnout Problem—in 6 
Charts, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/24/the-democrats-midterm-turnout-problem-
in-6-charts/ (reporting general demographic trends); Philip Bump, How 
Obama Misunderstands 2014 Turnout, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/29/how-
obama-misunderstands-2014-turnout/. 
22. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1935–Present, History, 
Art & Archives: U.S. House of Representatives, http://history. 
house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/74-Present/ (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015) [hereinafter Party Divisions of the House]; Party Division in the 
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During the George W. Bush Administration, Republicans controlled at 
least one house of Congress until the midterm elections of 2006 
delivered control of both houses to Democrats.23 
As a practical matter, these structural divisions between the two 
branches may yield sharp differences in policy priorities between Con-
gress and the executive branch, and enforcement controversies may be 
one important manifestation of such political disagreements. In the 
following discussion, I briefly sketch ways in which these dynamics have 
played out in recent administrations, concentrating in particular on the 
presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. 
This sketch is deliberately brief and impressionistic rather than ex-
haustive and systematic. My chief aim is to provide context for my 
normative analysis in Parts II and III by highlighting the degree to 
which the politics of nonenforcement are reversed today as compared 
to the recent past. 
A. President Ronald Reagan 
President Reagan assumed office with a perceived mandate to 
deregulate.24 Reagan advanced this objective principally by reducing or 
eliminating affirmative regulatory burdens. He thus established on his 
first full working day in office a Task Force on Regulatory Relief.25 
Chaired by Vice President George H.W. Bush, the task force undertook 
“a review of existing and proposed regulations to generate a list of those 
to be eliminated or scaled back.”26 Within a month, the President had 
also issued the landmark Executive Order 12,291, “Federal Regulation,” 
which required regulatory agencies to submit proposed regulations for 
cost-benefit review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”), a component of the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) within the Executive Office of the President.27 One lasting 
legacy of Executive Order 12,291 and subsequent orders regarding 
“regulatory review” has been increasingly centralized control over 
 
Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/history/ 
partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Party Division in 
the Senate]. 
23. Party Divisions of the House, supra note 22; Party Division in the Senate, 
supra note 22. 
24. See generally James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United 
States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore 174–77 (2005). 
25. Barry D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The 
Eruption of Presidential Influence 38 (1995).  
26. Reuel Schiller, An Unexpected Antagonist: Courts, Deregulation, and 
Conservative Judicial Ideology, 1980–94, in Making Legal History: 
Essays in Honor of William E. Nelson 264, 267 (Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein eds., 2013). 
27. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
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regulatory policy within the White House.28 At the time, however, a 
key objective was to impose the administration’s deregulatory ob-
jectives onto an unwieldy bureaucracy suspected of excessive enthus-
iasm for regulation.29 
While affirmative reduction in regulatory burdens thus took center 
stage in the Reagan Administration’s deregulatory effort, 
nonenforcement also played an important role. As Kate Andrias 
reports, although President Reagan “put no formal mechanism of 
enforcement coordination into place,” his administration generally 
sought budget reductions that limited the enforcement capacity of 
disfavored agencies.30 At the same time, his “political appointees in the 
various agencies gave life to his deregulatory commitments in part 
through the exercise of administrative enforcement discretion.”31 In 
some areas, the declines were dramatic: between 1980 and 1982, 
citations by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration fell 27 
percent, while penalties assessed fell by 78 percent; new EPA cases 
under a key environmental statute fell from forty-three in fiscal year 
1980 to three in 1982; and EPA’s regional offices forwarded only thirty-
six cases to the agency’s central office for enforcement in 1981 after 
forwarding 313 in 1980.32 In the area of civil rights, a 1989 report 
complained that “during the 1980s federal agencies virtually abandoned 
trial and appellate litigation as a tool to enforce most civil rights laws”; 
suits by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alone fell 70 
percent between 1981 and 1982.33 
In at least some instances, declining enforcement reflected delib-
erate policy. The administration formally abolished the EPA’s Office of 
Enforcement and transferred its functions to the agency’s legal office—
a fairly dramatic signal of reduced commitment to adversarial 
environmental enforcement.34 OSHA’s leadership deliberately altered 
 
28. One classic defense of this development is found in Elena Kagan’s article, 
Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277–78 (2001). 
For a more recent account, see Kate Andrias, The President’s 
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1054–69 (2013). 
29. See Schiller, supra note 26, at 267 (describing Reagan’s actions to de-
regulate after he assumed office). 
30. Andrias, supra note 28, at 1059. 
31. Id. 
32. Friedman, supra note 25, at 84. 
33. Citizen’s Commission on Civil Rights, One Nation Indivisible: 
The Civil Rights Challenge for the 1990s, at 6, 12, 14 (Riginald C. 
Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989). See generally Farhang, supra note 
17, at 173 (“Once in office, Reagan curtailed administrative enforcement 
of civil rights by numerous objective measures.”). 
34. Richard W. Waterman, Presidential Influence & the Admin-
istrative State 126 (1989).  
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the agency’s inspection practices and reduced field officers’ authority 
to issue certain citations.35 In the antitrust context, the administration 
pursued enforcement practices predicated on its policy view that 
“virtually all business activity except horizontal price fixing is good for 
the American consumer and good for the economy.”36 
The administration and its intellectual allies advanced legal 
theories to justify these deregulatory actions. With respect to dereg-
ulation itself, administration lawyers developed arguments (many ulti-
mately rejected by the courts) that deregulatory agency actions should 
receive reduced judicial scrutiny as compared to affirmative regulatory 
actions.37 With respect to nonenforcement, Assistant Attorney General 
William Baxter, the controversial head of the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division, published a law review article in 1982 defending the 
administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion to shape antitrust 
policy.38 Despite acknowledging that the Take Care Clause “imposes 
the duty . . . on the executive branch to enforce the law,”39 Baxter 
argued that “the Antitrust Division as an organ of the executive branch 
has considerable discretion in the selection of cases to prosecute and in 
the exercise of this discretion is not required to prosecute every type of 
conduct susceptible to challenge under existing judicial precedents.”40 
Baxter also argued that the common-law character of antitrust law 
made policy-driven uses of prosecutorial discretion particularly ap-
propriate in that context. “Congress relied upon the interaction of the 
judicial and executive branches to ensure the development of a work-
able and responsive law of competition,” Baxter wrote.41 Accordingly, 
the executive branch was “under no duty to prosecute cases involving 
conduct that has been found [unlawful] in the past or for which 
 
35. George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s 
Regulatory Dilemma 196–97 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 
1984).  
36. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and 
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 947 (1987). See also William French Smith, Law 
and Justice in the Reagan Administration: The Memoirs of an 
Attorney General 42–55 (1991) (“[O]ver the four years of the first 
term we produced a revolution in the government’s attitude toward 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.”). 
37. See Schiller, supra note 26, at 268–69. For critical analysis of these argu-
ments and judicial responses, see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and 
Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1985). 
38. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and 
the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 (1982). 
39. Id. at 674.  
40. Id. at 681–82. 
41. Id. at 702. 
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colorable arguments of illegality can be made unless the prosecution of 
these cases will promote the public interest.”42 
A year later, then-Judge Antonin Scalia (appointed to the D.C. 
Circuit by Reagan in 1982) offered a spirited defense of executive 
nonenforcement in a well-known lecture on The Doctrine of Standing 
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.43 Attacking the 
notion that courts should “enforce upon the executive branch adherence 
to legislative policies that the political process itself would not 
enforce,”44 Scalia argued: 
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests 
are affected, “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls 
of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of 
the federal bureaucracy?” Of course it does—and a good thing, 
too. Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or 
minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to 
get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday’s 
herald is today’s bore . . . . The ability to lose or misdirect laws 
can be said to be one of the prime engines of social change.45  
Then-Professor Frank Easterbrook similarly poked fun at “attacks” 
taking the “form” that “some rule is ‘the law,’ it has been enforced as 
the law in the past, so how dare today’s law-enforcement officials not 
enforce it?”46 Easterbrook argued: “Prosecutorial discretion is as much 
part of ‘the law’ as any other rule.”47 
For their part, the President’s opponents in Congress and elsewhere 
resisted the administration’s nonenforcement practices.48 President 
 
42. Id. 
43. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983). 
44. Id. at 896. 
45. Id. at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
46. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, Regulation: AEI J. 
on Gov’t & Soc’y 14 (Jan./Feb. 1983).  
47. Id. at 15. Easterbrook nevertheless correctly emphasized the limits of 
prosecutorial discretion and the basic obligation of agencies to implement 
statutory policies. He argued, “When the Antitrust Division [of the Justice 
Department] stops filing prosecutions [in certain cases,] . . . it does not 
send its staff away to take knitting lessons. It puts the lawyers to work 
on other cases. A conscientious department keeps changing its enforce-
ment decisions until it gets the most benefit it can out of them.” Id. 
48. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 36, at 52–53 (describing media and 
congressional opposition to antitrust policies); Kenneth J. Meier, 
Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, & Economics 231 (1985) (not-
ing contentious oversight of OSHA); Farhang, supra note 17, at 178–80 
(discussing congressional oversight of civil rights enforcement in the 1980s 
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Reagan’s environmental enforcement policies produced particularly 
acute opposition in Congress. Concerned that the President’s EPA 
Administrator was failing to enforce the powerful toxic waste cleanup 
provisions in the newly minted Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) of 1980, 
House committees held repeated oversight hearings and subpoenaed 
enforcement-related documents.49 In 1983, after the administration, 
claiming executive privilege, refused to produce subpoenaed materials, 
the House of Representatives held the Administrator in contempt.50 In 
language that resonates with contemporary debates, a House 
committee’s contempt referral asserted:  
 
The power conferred by the Constitution under [the Take Care 
Clause] is primarily to empower the President simply to carry out 
the laws enacted by Congress. It neither expressly nor impliedly 
authorizes the President, or any agency, to withhold documents 
essential to evaluating the administration of the laws passed by 
Congress which the President is to “faithfully” execute.51 
 
The administration ultimately softened its posture on 
environmental enforcement and negotiated a deal to release the 
disputed documents.52 Yet Congress remained suspicious of the 
administration’s commitment to environmental protection, as reflected 
in a series of statutes confining its discretion to evade regulatory 
mandates.53 In at least one environmental statute, Congress specifically 
required executive enforcement of any violations not pursued by 
states.54 President Reagan objected in a signing statement, asserting 
that the statute’s suggestion that “some enforcement actions are 
 
and describing the decade as “marked by implacable conflict over civil 
rights policy between Congress and the executive branch”). 
49. See generally Jeffrey K. Stine, Natural Resources and Environmental 
Policy, in The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and 
Its Legacies 233, 241–42 (W. Elliot Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham 
eds., 2003) (describing the controversy and the subsequent committee 
investigation).  
50. See Philip Shabecoff, House Charges Head of E.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 17, 1982, at A1. 
51. H.R. Rep. No. 97-968, at 11 (1982). 
52. See Stine, supra note 49, at 242–43; WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 133–37. 
53. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J. 
819, 825–27 (1988) (describing congressional effort in the late 1980s to 
impose “more effective legislative controls on the EPA”). 
54. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339 § 102, 
100 Stat. 642 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(a)). 
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mandatory” was of “questionable validity” because “Congress cannot 
bind the Executive in advance and remove all prosecutorial discretion 
without infringing on the powers of the Executive.”55 
As the Reagan Administration drew to a close, leading 
administration lawyers and academic supporters complained about a 
“fettered presidency.”56 Amid a litany of asserted congressional excess-
es, one former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel lamented that “legislation is often proposed, and occasionally 
passed, that would strip the president’s discretion to decide not to 
prosecute a particular offense.”57 
B. President George W. Bush 
While President George H.W. Bush appears to have continued (or 
in some cases softened) patterns set by President Reagan,58 the next 
Republican President, President George W. Bush, arguably pushed 
nonenforcement further.59 The familiar Reagan-era tools of budget cuts 
and appointment of deregulatory agency heads produced aggregate 
declines in enforcement rates and less aggressive enforcement tactics in 
many areas.60 The breadth and pervasiveness of these shifts, however, 
have prompted some observers to posit that “Bush exercised more 
extensive control over enforcement than did many of his predecessors,” 
even if “the White House rarely claimed responsibility for [enforcement] 
decisions.”61 
White House fingerprints were perhaps most visible on key aspects 
of environmental enforcement. Taking its cue from Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s controversial Energy Task Force, the EPA promulgated 
regulations that effectively exempted many power plant renovations 
 
55. Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act 
Amendments of 1986 (June 19, 1986). 
56. The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive 
Branch (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989). 
57. Theodore B. Olsen, The Impetuous Vortex: Erosion of Presidential Auth-
ority, in The Fettered Presidency, supra note 56, at 225, 233. 
58. On President Bush’s approach to regulation and domestic policy gener-
ally, see Friedman, supra note 25, at 160–68; Patterson, supra note 24, 
at 240; John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush 61–
63 (2000). I omit discussion of President Clinton so as to concentrate on 
President Obama’s Republican predecessors and because enforcement-
related controversies appear not to have been a dominant theme of the 
Clinton Presidency. See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1059–60. 
59. See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1061–63. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1061. 
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from so-called “new source review” requirements of the Clean Air Act.62 
Although these statutory provisions generally require otherwise-
grandfathered power plants to comply with stricter pollution controls 
following certain renovations, the EPA’s regulations carved out an 
extensive safe harbor from this statutory mandate.63 The D.C. Circuit 
ultimately invalidated the safe harbor, calling it consistent with the 
statutory language “[o]nly in a Humpty Dumpty world.”64 Nevertheless, 
the agency continued to exempt such plants from the statute as a 
matter of enforcement practice.65 
Steep declines were also evident at other key agencies. For example, 
the number of warning letters issued by the FDA declined by more 
than 50 percent between 2000 and 2005 while the number of seizures of 
dangerous products fell by 44 percent.66 The Department of Labor’s 
Inspector General faulted the agency for inadequate mine inspections 
and insufficient attention to employers with serious workplace safety 
issues.67 In both cases, the Inspector General blamed management 
inattention as well as resource constraints for the problems.68 Similarly, 
the Government Accountability Office found that the Labor Depart-
ment’s Wage and Hour Division followed an “ineffective” complaint-
processing system that included, among other flaws, excessive reliance 
 
62. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering 
and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source 
Review, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1677, 1681–1705 (2007) (providing back-
ground on New Source Review); Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong 
Enforcement Works Better Than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New 
Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1204 (2013) 
(describing New Source Review enforcement during the George W. Bush 
administration). 
63. See McGarity, supra note 62, at 1243–70; Nash & Revesz, supra note 62, 
at 1702–04. 
64. New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
65. Andrias, supra note 28, at 1063. For my own critical analysis of this 
policy, see Price, supra note 10, at 762–63. 
66. Staff of H. Comm. on Gov. Reform, Special Investigations 
Division, 109th Cong., Prescription for Harm: The Decline in 
FDA Enforcement Activity 11, 13 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter 
Prescription for Harm] (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
67. Dep’t of Labor, Office of Inspector General—Office of Audit, 
Report No. 02-09-203-10-105, Employers with Reported Fatal-
ities Were Not Always Properly Identified & Inspected Under 
OSHA’s Enhanced Enforcement Program (2009); Dep’t of Labor, 
Office of Inspector General—Office of Audit, Report No. 05-
08-001-06-001, Underground Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not 
Fulfilled Due to Resource Limitations and Lack of 
Management Emphasis (2007). 
68. Employers with Reported Fatalities, supra note 67, at 3; 
Underground Coal Mine Inspection, supra note 67, at 1. 
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on noncoercive conciliatory measures against employers in response to 
complaints.69 
Perhaps most controversially, the Civil Rights Division of the 
Justice Department shifted enforcement priorities in ways that 
administration critics viewed as political.70 The Division filed signif-
icantly fewer employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,71 with particularly steep declines in cases on 
behalf of African Americans.72 The Division also brought fewer voting-
rights cases under section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.73 
According to critics, “[t]he Division appeared to displace its traditional 
concern for the voting rights of African-Americans with a predominant 
focus on Hispanic voters through its choice of section 2 litigation and 
through its enforcement of the language access provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act.”74 At the same time, the Division’s political leadership 
repeatedly overruled staff recommendations on other voting-rights 
issues, particularly where Republican Party interests appeared to be at 
stake.75 
As during the Reagan Administration, President Bush’s political 
opponents detected such enforcement trends and sought to hold the 
administration accountable. For instance, after regaining control of 
Congress, Democrats exercised vigorous oversight over Justice Depart-
ment practices.76 A House committee conducted oversight hearings on 
the Department’s civil rights enforcement.77 Even earlier, minority staff 
on a House committee issued a scathing report faulting the FDA for 
 
69. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-458T, Dep’t of La-
bor: Wage & Hour Division’s Complaint Intake and Invest-
igative Processes Leave Low Wage Workers Vulnerable to 
Wage Theft, at i, 9, 19–21, 24–25 (2009). 
70. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration & Civil Rights: Lessons 
Learned, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 77 (2009); Sen. Edward 
M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 211 (2008). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012). 
72. Liu, supra note 70, at 80. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012); Liu, supra note 70, at 79. 
74. Liu, supra note 70, at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
75. Id. at 82–86. 
76. See id. at 87–88, n.50. 
77. See, e.g., Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights 
Enforcement Within the Department of Justice, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 44 (2007). See also Kennedy, supra note 
70, at 234–35. 
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abdicating its statutory mission.78 Addressing the administration’s 
record of civil rights enforcement, a Democratic subcommittee chair-
man complained, “If the rule of law is to have any meaning, if the civil 
rights laws this Committee produces are to have any value, then we 
must be assured that those laws will be enforced without fear, favor, or 
political contamination.”79 
C. President Barack Obama 
Given nonenforcement’s use as a deregulatory tool in previous 
administrations, the close political identification of nonenforcement 
with President Obama—a President strongly committed to the social 
utility of regulation—is surprising, as is congressional Republicans’ 
insistence on a strong executive enforcement obligation. Yet the Obama 
Administration has provoked controversy with nonenforcement policies 
in several key areas. 
To begin with, in a series of memoranda from the Deputy Attorney 
General to the U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department adopted an 
overt policy of giving low priority to prosecution of federal marijuana 
offenses where the offender complied with state law.80 Although federal 
law criminalizes marijuana possession and distribution, federal officials 
have not devoted significant resources to ground-level enforcement of 
 
78. Prescription for Harm, supra note 66. 
79. Changing Tides, supra note 77, at 2 (prepared statement of Rep. Jerrold 
Nadler). 
80. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys, 
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/legacy 
/2014/02/14/DAG%20Memo%20-%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Mari 
juana%20Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2014%20%282%2
9.pdf; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. 
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 Cole Enforcement Memorandum], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys, 
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to 
Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 1–2 (June 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-
guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf; Memorandum from David 
W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected U.S. Att’ys, Investigations and 
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1–2 
(Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. The Department recently 
extended the same treatment to Native American tribes. See Memo-
randum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir., Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, 
U.S. Department of Justice, to U.S. Att’ys, Policy Statement Regarding 
Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/20
14/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry2.pdf. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Politics of Nonenforcement 
1134 
these prohibitions.81 States, however, began liberalizing their own 
marijuana prohibitions, and in 2012 Colorado and Washington decrim-
inalized recreational use of the drug.82 While in some sense the new 
federal policy simply preserved traditional federal enforcement 
priorities in the face of these state law changes, the practical effect of 
the Department’s publicly stated policy was to get federal law out of 
the way of new state experiments in liberalization.83 The result has been 
a remarkable boom in overt marijuana businesses in some areas, 
particularly Colorado.84 
A second set of controversial policies involved implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act. Although the statute set clear effective dates 
for key provisions, the Department of Health and Human Services 
effectively postponed these deadlines for lengthy periods for two key 
sets of statutory requirements: first, the requirement that health 
insurance plans meet certain coverage requirements; and second, the 
so-called employer mandate, which penalizes employers above a certain 
size for failing to provide health insurance for their employees.85 In 
support of both policies, the agency claimed organic authority to pro-
vide “transition relief” by declining enforcement of statutory restrict-
ions while the law was first taking effect. 
 
81. See 2013 Cole Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 80, at 2. For figures 
on recent enforcement, see Price, supra note 10, at 757 n.368. 
82. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16 (amended 2014); Wash. Initiative Measure 
No. 502 (July 8, 2011). 
83. For my own qualified defense of the policy’s legality, see Price, supra note 
10, at 757–59. 
84. See Niraj Chokshi, Marijuana Could Deliver More Than $800 Million in 
Revenue to Washington and Colorado, GovBeat, WASH. POST (Sept. 
26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/
26/marijuana-could-deliver-more-than-800-million-in-revenue-to-washing 
ton-and-colorado/. 
85. See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. 
Oversight, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 
14, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters 
/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf (indicating that health 
plans “will not be considered to be out of compliance” with statutory 
insurance requirements under specified circumstances); Bulletin from 
Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Extension of 
Transitional Policy Through October 1, 2016 (Mar. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Downloads/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf (extending 
policy to plan years beginning before October 1, 2016); I.R.S. Notice 2013-
45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 29, 2013) (providing relief from penalties for 
employers who fail to provide insurance as required by statute); Shared 
Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 
8543, 8569 (Feb. 12, 2014) (extending transition relief from penalties for 
certain employers). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Politics of Nonenforcement 
1135 
Finally, President Obama’s most controversial executive actions 
relate to immigration. As a result of decades of failed immigration 
enforcement, the United States is home to a substantial population of 
undocumented immigrants—individuals who either entered the United 
States unlawfully or overstayed visas allowing their entrance. In two 
bold policy initiatives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
exercised its “prosecutorial discretion” to shield substantial components 
of this population from removal. DHS announced its first initiative in 
2012: the so-called “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA). 
DACA addressed some of the most compelling candidates for immigra-
tion relief: the so-called “dreamers”—individuals who entered the 
United States as young children and have grown up to be law-abiding 
Americans.86 In 2014, the Department announced a similar program for 
undocumented immigrants who are parents of U.S. citizens or legal 
permanent residents.87 In both programs, the Department invited immi-
grants in covered groups to apply for “deferred action,” a form of 
immigration relief in which the government promises for a specified 
renewable period (three years under these policies) not to seek the 
immigrant’s removal from the United States.88 Though technically 
revocable at any time, “deferred action” normally amounts in practice 
to a temporary guarantee of non-removal. Under immigration 
regulations, moreover, it entails eligibility for work authorization,89 
 
86. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
for David Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretio 
n-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
87. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., for Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et 
al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbed 
dedFile/57134.  
88. For a general description of deferred action, see Memorandum Opinion 
from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. & 
the Counsel to the President, The Department of Homeland Security’s 
Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in 
the United States and to Defer Removal of Others at 12–18 (Nov. 19, 
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opin 
ions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf 
[hereinafter Authority to Prioritize Removal]. 
89. Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept Employment, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 274a.12(c)(14) (2014). 
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notwithstanding general statutory prohibitions on employment of un-
documented workers.90 
Although the administration and its allies invoked executive prece-
dents to support these policies,91 congressional Republicans have fiercely 
attacked their legality. In a report advocating legislation to authorize 
congressional suits against the President, the House Committee on 
Rules declared: 
[T]he President has failed on numerous occasions to fulfill his 
duty under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution of the United 
States to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress. He has 
ignored certain statutes completely, selectively enforced others, 
and bypassed the legislative process to create his own laws by 
executive fiat. These unilateral actions have led to a shift in the 
balance of power in favor of the presidency, challenging Congress’ 
ability to effectively represent the American people.92 
II. Criteria of Faithful Execution 
Recent presidents, then, have used nonenforcement as a policy-
making tool with increasing boldness. Presidents Reagan and Bush 
helped to normalize policy-driven exercises of enforcement discretion by 
dramatically reducing or diverting enforcement efforts with respect to 
laws they disfavored. President Obama has not only continued the 
trend toward policy-driven nonenforcement but also brought this 
executive practice into the open by publicly announcing 
nonenforcement policies on high-profile issues and claiming credit for 
them to a degree earlier presidents did not. As Professor Andrias 
observes, although presidents since Reagan have consistently claimed 
ownership and control over regulatory policy, “presidential attention to 
agency enforcement efforts has been comparatively informal, episodic, 
and opaque.”93 President Obama may thus herald a shift toward more 
transparent and centralized control over enforcement decisions. 
Powerful structural forces underlie these developments. On the one 
hand, increasing partisan division in Congress and the resulting 
difficulty of legislative action place pressure on Presidents to address 
 
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2012). 
91. See, e.g., Authority to Prioritize Removal, supra note 88, at 18–20, 23–
24 (approving legality of deferred action program for parents of U.S. 
citizens and legal permanent residents based on asserted congressional 
acquiescence in past exercise of “categorical” deferred action); I.R.S. 
Notice, supra note 85 (invoking past provision of “transition relief” as 
authority for temporary suspension of ACA’s employer mandate). 
92. H.R. Rep. No. 113-561, at 2 (2014). 
93. Andrias, supra note 28, at 1069. 
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constituent demands through executive action.94 On the other hand, the 
accretion of regulatory statutes over time, resulting in “a world thick 
with federal statutes,”95 heightens the policy significance of 
nonenforcement. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 
nonenforcement advanced deregulatory goals with respect to social and 
economic regulation. The Obama Administration, in contrast, has 
applied nonenforcement to weaken harsh immigration and drug 
statutes. In both cases, political contestation over the social value of 
previously enacted statutes drove executive efforts to weaken those 
statutes’ practical effect. 
Nonenforcement thus appears likely to remain an important 
category of executive action. To the extent that is true, we need criteria 
for assessing the fidelity of an administration’s enforcement practices 
to underlying statutory policies. If executive officials are duty-bound to 
enforce statutory policies but nevertheless must exercise tremendous 
discretion in doing so, how may we assess their faithfulness to statutory 
policies? 
I have elsewhere argued that, although faithful execution is often 
more a matter of mindset and degree than any sort of bright-line legal 
determination, policies with a strongly categorical and prospective 
character should generally be impermissible without specific statutory 
authorization.96 If enforcement discretion is fundamentally an authority 
to turn a blind eye to some violations so as to concentrate on others—
that is, to set priorities for enforcement without altering the basic policy 
of the statute—then policies that amount in practice to a prospective 
guarantee of nonenforcement to broad categories of offenders should be 
presumptively improper. Even within the outer bounds of legal 
permissibility, however, some enforcement policies may be more or less 
faithful to underlying statutes. 
Without attempting an exhaustive analysis here, I offer in this Part 
some reflections on pertinent criteria of faithful execution, with an 
emphasis on ways in which enforcement differs from other forms of 
executive action. Some pertinent measures of faithful execution are  
94. For an account of political polarization, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the 
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (“American democracy over 
the last generation has had one defining attribute: the rise of extreme 
partisan polarization.”). 
95. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 270, 301–03 (2013) (“As much as the modern federal 
administrative state depends upon the delegation of regulatory discretion 
to make law, it also involves a dramatic upsurge in the federal statutory 
presence.”). 
96. See Price, supra note 10, at 677, 754–55, 759–61. That is not to say that 
such policies should necessarily be subject to judicial review and 
invalidation. For my views on the proper judicial role on enforcement 
questions, see Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
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straightforward and obvious: As the Reagan and Bush examples 
illustrate, reductions in enforcement intensity and diversion of resources 
from core statutory priorities may be important measures of an agency’s 
fidelity to legislative mandates. But some other criteria are more 
complex. In particular, transparency, clarity, and central direction—
qualities that are often considered virtues in other administrative 
contexts—will often be vices with respect to enforcement, at least if the 
standard by which executive action is judged is fidelity to statutory 
policies. 
Consider transparency first. Although it has the virtue of making 
an administration’s priorities clear, enforcement transparency will often 
be counterproductive: the more public the nonenforcement policy, the 
stronger the signal to regulated parties that they may organize their 
behavior around the enforcement policy rather than the statute or 
regulation.97 Many politically volatile regulatory regimes—ranging from 
tax enforcement and workplace safety regulation to environmental and 
consumer protection—depend on maintaining the deterrent effect of 
statutory prohibitions that the agency can realistically enforce in only 
a tiny fraction of cases. The Internal Revenue Service, for instance, can 
audit only a small fraction (roughly 1 percent) of the tax returns it 
receives.98 Accordingly, although it employs internal criteria to identify 
returns for audits, it quite properly keeps those criteria secret—for the 
obvious reason that disclosure would enable tax evasion.99 The Justice 
Department’s contrary choice to disclose its marijuana enforcement 
policy illustrates the same point. Despite the policy’s vague and 
noncommittal character, it has nevertheless prompted a remarkable 
flourishing of illegal marijuana businesses in Colorado and elsewhere.100 
It seems doubtful that entrepreneurs and state officials would have felt 
the same legal security had the federal government adopted the same 
enforcement priorities but kept them secret. As these examples 
illustrate, transparent enforcement policies may provide clarity and 
predictability to regulated parties, but precisely by doing so they may 
undermine statutory policies to a degree that nonpublic internal 
guidance would not. 
 
97. For this reason, an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act shields 
agency documents whose production “would disclose guidelines for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7) (2012). According to the D.C. Circuit, “the importance of 
deterrence explains why the exemption is written in broad and general 
terms.” Mayer Brown LLP v. I.R.S., 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
98. Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 
241, 258 (2013). 
99. Id. 
100. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, the worst of all worlds may be a policy that is trans-
parent to regulated parties but not to the public. Some have proposed 
greater transparency as a means of preventing such sweetheart 
arrangements and ensuring public accountability for agency enforce-
ment choices.101 As a practical matter, executive officials will likely 
resist disclosing (or even memorializing) policies whose disclosure would 
be politically disadvantageous. But in any event, if non-public assur-
ances are easier for executive officials to provide, they may also be easier 
to recant. To the extent publicly announced policies provide a stronger 
assurance of nonenforcement to regulated parties, publicly disclosed 
policies may thus pose the greater threat to statutory policies. 
Furthermore, examples discussed above suggest that initial public 
disclosure may not always be necessary to ensure political resistance 
and accountability. The Reagan and Bush Administrations’ practices 
with respect to the environment, workplace safety, and civil rights were 
all evident to congressional critics and interest groups, even without 
any public announcement of new priorities.102 And while some of these 
policies might have been harder to adopt had they been publicly 
announced, political opponents and congressional critics nevertheless 
often succeeded in imposing political costs and even in some cases 
inducing a change of direction.103 At any rate, on a systemic level, more 
transparent nonenforcement risks normalizing a perception that 
 
101. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 28, at 1117 (“[D]isclosure of enforcement 
policy decisions, accompanied by explanations rooted in law, would 
discipline exercises of presidential enforcement discretion.”); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1690–91 (2004) (advocating agency 
“reason-giving” with respect to enforcement decisions in part because 
“[w]hen agencies offer open, public-regarding, and otherwise rational 
reasons, they reduce opportunities for covert, private-interested, or 
otherwise arbitrary ones”). 
102. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
103. Reagan-era congressional opposition to environmental deregulation was 
particularly successful in forcing legal and administrative changes. See 
generally WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 133–37 (explaining that although 
the Reagan administration successfully accomplished many of its goals 
during its first two years by reducing enforcement activity and delegating 
authority to the states, a “counterrevolution” forced the administration 
to “moderate its environmental policy”). Congress admittedly exercises 
more effective oversight during periods of divided government. For 
discussion of the importance of divided government to separation of 
powers generally and proposals to enhance minority rights as a means of 
ensuring more effective oversight, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2312 (2006) 
(“The practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified 
government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional 
distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch 
political dynamics.”). 
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statutory enforcement is optional. Hence, if the goal of transparency is 
to enable accountability for inappropriate under-enforcement, then 
transparency may erode the very norm it seeks to maintain. 
Centralization is a double-edged sword too. Ever since President 
Reagan kick-started “presidential administration” by established 
centralized regulatory review,104 scholars have debated the virtues of 
White House control over regulatory policy.105 While centralized control 
promises the benefit of increased political accountability for exercises 
of delegated discretion,106 it carries the risk of political manipulation 
and reduced reliance on neutral agency expertise.107 Centralized 
decision-making with respect to enforcement involves similar potential 
benefits. To the extent mismatched statutory mandates and agency 
budgets necessitate extensive enforcement discretion, centralized polit-
ical accountability for how that discretion is exercised seems desirable; 
indeed, some degree of centralized accountability may even be constitu-
tionally essential.108 What is more, insofar as different agencies hold 
overlapping or conflicting mandates, centralized coordination may be 
essential to maintaining coherent executive branch policy.109  
But centralized control also carries analogous risks. Insofar as 
greater centralization invites greater political pressure on enforcement 
practices, centralization might push agencies toward policies less 
faithful to underlying statutory mandates. Positing that individual 
prosecutorial decisions present the greatest risk of political 
manipulation (or even corruption), Professor Andrias thoughtfully 
proposes a norm of centralized control over general agency priorities 
 
104. See supra Part I.A. 
105. For a small sampling of the literature on this question, see Rena Steinzor, 
The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 
Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 210 (2012); Nicholas Bagley & Richard 
L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1260 (2006); Kagan, supra note 28; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995); 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1082 (1986). 
106. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 28, at 2331–39. 
107. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 757 (2007). 
108. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (upholding the for-cause 
removal limitation for federal prosecutor because the Court did “not think 
that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently deprives the Pres-
ident of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly 
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the 
laws”). 
109. See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1084–90, for discussion of this imperative 
of inter-agency enforcement coordination. 
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and dispersed control over individual prosecutorial decisions.110 As the 
examples addressed above illustrate, however, greater centralization 
might invite even wilder swings in enforcement levels in politically 
volatile areas of regulation. Left to their own devices, mission-driven 
agencies might adopt different priorities from politically-driven 
presidents.111 In practice, a shift toward stronger presidential control 
might thus mean a shift toward weaker norms of statutory 
supremacy.112 
A final, related measure of agency fidelity to statutory policies is 
the degree of clarity in enforcement practices. To some minds at least, 
more rule-like policies are more consistent with rule-of-law values—the 
“rule of law as a law of rules,” as Justice Scalia famously put it.113 As 
Gillian Metzger has argued, moreover, categorical policies may ensure 
tighter centralized control (and thus accountability) by leaving indi-
vidual officers with less discretion to depart from centrally directed 
priorities.114 Yet more categorical policies also depart more starkly from 
the policy of the statute. By eliminating risks of enforcement outside 
the designated priorities, categorical policies—particularly if they are 
publicly announced—may shift the on-the-ground rule of law from the 
rule of the statute to the rule of the enforcement policy.115 
Accordingly, one important way in which executive agencies 
express their subservience to statutory policies is precisely by maintain-
ing some indefiniteness in their enforcement policies—by framing those 
policies as priorities rather than guarantees. By doing so, executive  
110. Andrias, supra note 28, at 1136–41. 
111. Professor Andrias acknowledges that “[i]n theory, agencies with a clear 
mission are less likely to deviate from statutory purpose than is a 
President facing multiple pressures.” Andrias, supra note 28, at 1098. She 
argues, however, that presidential influence is happening anyway, and 
“[d]rift is less likely if this role is more public.” Id. Recent examples, 
particularly President Obama’s action on immigration, suggest that this 
surmise may not always be correct: Ability to claim political credit for 
enforcement policies may sometimes encourage more aggressive 
nonenforcement policies, particularly in a polarized electoral environment 
where motivating core constituencies is central to electoral success. 
112. I borrow the term “statutory supremacy” from Eric Biber. See Eric Biber, 
The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 
Admin. L. Rev. 1, 5, 24 (2008). 
113. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989). 
114. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
115. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
157, 176 (1996) (“it is a relatively elementary legal realist insight that 
when there is a single enforcement authority, a decision not to enforce 
under stated circumstances is indistinguishable from amending the 
underlying ‘rule’ to exempt the affected conduct from prohibition”). 
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officials avoid, to the greatest extent possible, either definite pros-
pective assurances of nonenforcement or rule-like categorical dis-
tinctions between offenders—two forms of nonenforcement that, as 
noted earlier, will often amount to implementing a different policy from 
the statute itself.116 Courts police this norm indirectly in the APA 
context by insisting that agency policies may qualify as “general 
statement[s] of policy,” and thus avoid notice-and-comment procedures 
required for promulgation of rules,117 only if they retain a degree of 
indefiniteness.118 
It is true, as Professor Metzger argues, that the Take Care Clause 
also imposes a duty to supervise on the President: as the clause’s 
“passive [construction] and the sheer practical impossibility of any other 
result” make clear, “the actual execution of the laws will be done by 
others,” thus making the duty imposed by the clause one of mandatory 
supervisory responsibility.119 Insofar as transparent, categorical policies 
impose greater constraint on low-level officials, Metzger argues that this 
constitutional duty to supervise may provide a constitutional foun-
dation for them.120 In the enforcement context, however, the duty to 
supervise is not freestanding but rather serves a specified purpose—to 
ensure faithful execution. The duty to supervise, then, presents once 
again the problem of assessing faithful execution. For the reasons noted, 
more definite categorical policies (particularly when publicly revealed) 
may often be less faithful to underlying statutory mandates.121 
Some have also argued that agency policies should seek to minimize 
arbitrariness, and from that perspective, too, less definite enforcement 
policies may seem less desirable.122 After all, by retaining a degree of 
case-by-case decision-making and avoiding any firm commitment,  
116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
117. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
118. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(“[A]n agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical 
matter [and thus subject to notice and comment procedures] if it either 
appears on its face to be binding or is applied by the agency in a way that 
indicates it is binding.”) (internal citations omitted); United States Tel. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that policy 
statements using mandatory, definitive language are rules subject to 
notice and comment procedures); Alaska v. United States Dep’t of 
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445–46 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (a “general statement of 
policy” must “genuinely leave[] the agency . . . free to exercise discretion”) 
(quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945–46 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). 
119. Metzger, supra note 114 (manuscript at 30–31) (on file with author). 
120. Id. (manuscript at 72–73) (on file with author). 
121. Cf. id. (manuscript at 73) (on file with author) (acknowledging that “this 
does not mean that recognizing the duty [to supervise] requires accepting 
all instances of presidential direction and administration”). 
122. See Bressman, supra note 101, at 1692–93. 
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indefinite enforcement guidelines may invite a degree of randomness 
that more definite policies might avoid. Again, however, if the rule of 
law is the rule of the statute, then treating all violators identically may 
not be the paramount value. On the contrary, although rank favoritism, 
corruption, and bias of course have no place in an appropriate 
enforcement regime, one violator’s avoidance of sanctions does not 
necessarily make the next violator more sympathetic. At any rate, as 
compared to more definite policies, framing enforcement priorities as 
guidelines rather than rules may often strike an appropriate balance by 
assuring consistency and top-down direction without signaling to 
regulated parties a fundamental change in the underlying rule of law. 
Thus, in addition to overall enforcement intensity and appropriate 
selection of priorities, transparency, centralization, and definiteness are 
axes along which the fidelity of enforcement policies to statutory man-
dates may be assessed. All else being equal, clear, transparent, centrally 
directed guarantees of nonenforcement may conflict with statutory 
policies to a degree that internal, agency-derived, indefinite 
enforcement policies do not. Values of transparency, centralization, and 
clarity, though virtues in other administrative contexts, are potential 
vices here, at least if the overall objective is ensuring executive fidelity 
to statutory policies. 
But trend lines are running in the opposite direction. As the 
historical sketch above illustrates, recent administrations have claimed 
authority to shift enforcement in ways that conform to presidential 
policy preferences. The current administration has given renewed 
impetus to this trend. The central question, then, is what norms the 
public should expect or desire. Is greater policy-driven nonenforcement 
a positive or negative development? Should we prefer transparent, 
definite, centrally directed nonenforcement? Or should we prefer norms 
that induce executive officials to enforce laws to the best of their ability 
even when they disfavor the policies those laws reflect? 
III. Practical Benefits of Strong Enforcement 
On some level, these questions have formal answers. Notwithstand-
ing the difficulty of identifying clear outer boundaries of appropriate 
enforcement discretion, the formal constitutional structure supports 
maintaining a strong norm of executive obligation to implement 
statutory policies. The Take Care Clause, by its terms, obligates the 
President to ensure faithful implementation of statutory policies. 
Likewise, the President’s limited role in lawmaking implies an executive 
obligation to carry out enacted laws even if the President disagrees with 
them.123 Indeed, the sheer difficulty of deciding upon appropriate 
 
123. See Price, supra note 10, for elaboration of the argument in this 
paragraph. 
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interbranch norms through more abstract analysis reinforces the value 
of resolving the question by reference to the formal constitutional 
structure. To be sure, some have questioned the distinctive tendency of 
American constitutionalism to divert policy disagreements into battles 
over constitutional principle.124 But in principle constitutional analysis 
may permit resolution of heated political controversies in a manner that 
looks beyond the politics of the moment and thus establishes more 
durable legal norms. 
 Nevertheless, to the extent we stand at a crossroads, it is worth 
thinking too about practical benefits and costs. What systemic effects 
might weakening norms of executive enforcement obligation have on 
interbranch relations? To put the point more starkly, what benefit 
might a clear-eyed, politically motivated President, locked in partisan 
battle and buffeted by capricious swings in public opinion, derive from 
maintaining such a norm? Although my observations on this point are 
speculative and provisional, eroding norms of executive enforcement 
obligation could carry at least three significant costs. 
 The first, and most important, is that bold nonenforcement 
initiatives by one administration may weaken parallel constraints on 
future administrations with different policy objectives. As a general 
matter, the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment 
makes lawmaking hard. To become a law, a bill must surmount 
multiple hurdles: approval by appropriate congressional committees, 
passage by both houses of Congress, and ultimately presidential 
approval (or a veto override). In some contexts, to be sure, legislative 
bargains between the President and the two houses of Congress might 
enable passage of stronger regulation than any one house or the 
President would consider optimal.125 But, in general, the multiple veto 
gates built into the constitutional process favor inertia.126 What is more, 
as Dino Christenson and Douglas Kriner explain in their contribution 
to this symposium, super-majoritarian features of the lawmaking 
process, such as Senate filibuster rules and the constitutional 
requirement of a two-thirds majority for veto overrides, create a 
 
124. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience 
(2013); cf. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the 
Early Republic, 1789–1815, at 185 (2009) (describing the early 
emergence of “the peculiar American tendency to discuss political issues 
in constitutional terms—a tendency that had the effect of turning quarrels 
over policy into contests over basic principles”). 
125. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The 
Precedents & Principles We Live By 427–28 (2012) (discussing this 
possibility). 
126. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1444–49 (2008) (describing multiple 
“vetogates” that impede legislation). 
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“gridlock interval” in which legislative action is impossible even though 
a median voter would favor legal change.127 
The upshot of this lawmaking structure is that major legislative 
achievements—laws like the Affordable Care Act, the Clean Air Act, 
or the 1996 welfare reform128—may be possible in some political mo-
ments but not others. Both sides of our divided politics may thus have 
an interest in ensuring that their own legislative victories stick. Yet 
ensuring that one side’s victories stick requires permitting the other 
side’s to stick too. In short, executive branch precedent matters, both 
legally and practically.129 Future Presidents can be expected to act with 
greater latitude when they can point to analogous actions by their pre-
decessors. 
Ironically, although current political alignments mask this reality, 
Democrats may have more at stake than Republicans in maintaining 
strong norms of statutory enforcement. Admittedly, political opposition 
to President Obama’s nonenforcement initiatives makes plain that core 
Republican constituencies care about at least some forms of regulation. 
But in general, amid our deeply polarized politics, Democrats are the 
party more committed in principle to the value of regulation in promot-
ing social change and restraining undue private power. Nonenforcement 
is fundamentally a deregulatory power: it is a power to strip force from 
enacted legal requirements. As examples described in Part I demon-
strate, Republican Presidents with deregulatory agendas have used it 
that way. What is more, they have done so in many areas of regulation 
(such as environmental protection, workplace safety, antitrust, 
consumer protection, and civil rights) that Democrats have 
traditionally favored. Many such areas involve practical challenges and 
resource constraints similar to those used to justify the current admini-
stration’s marijuana and immigration nonenforcement policies. Demo-
crats may thus have reason to worry about what future Republican 
presidents might do with precedents this administration has set. 
A second potential cost to bolder nonenforcement is that it might 
mean ratcheting up still further the current toxic level of interbranch 
conflict. To be sure, how precisely current congressional-executive 
disagreements over enforcement practice will play out remains to be 
 
127. See generally Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political 
Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
897 (2015). 
128. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
129. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (observing 
that “the longstanding practice of the government can inform our 
determination of what the law is” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)); Authority to Prioritize Removal at 18 (relying in part on past 
executive actions and presumed congressional acquiescence to justify 
immigration program). 
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seen. Characterizing President Obama’s policies as a form of 
constitutional self-help, David Pozen has argued that violating general 
executive enforcement norms might sometimes be justified as a 
proportional countermeasure for congressional violations of legislative 
norms (such as conventional limits on filibusters and other obstructive 
tactics).130 By reconceptualizing interbranch relationships in terms of 
self-help, Professor Pozen suggests, the two branches may arrive at a 
stable equilibrium despite formal constitutional violations on both 
sides.131 Yet Pozen also concedes the risk of reciprocal escalation 
inherent in self-help remedies,132 and the risk seems significant here, 
given Congress’s perception of its own actions as legitimate (or at least 
constitutional) and the President’s as unconstitutional. Thus, whether 
or not Pozen is correct that otherwise unconstitutional actions may 
become valid as remedies for another branch’s abuses, broadening use 
of policy-driven nonenforcement may carry the risk of encouraging 
further bare-knuckle responses from Congress and thus exacerbating—
as well as or instead of correcting or managing—political gridlock. 
A final practical consequence to consider is the effect of 
nonenforcement on the structure of federal law as a whole. The systemic 
effects of enforcement discretion are paradoxical: While prosecutorial 
discretion provides a crucial safety valve against rigorous enforcement 
of outdated or unrealistic laws, persistent nonenforcement also permits 
laws to remain in place that would be politically intolerable if fully 
enforced.133 President Ulysses Grant once remarked, “I know no method 
to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their 
stringent execution.”134 Modern presidents, responsible for executing 
laws that cannot possibly be fully enforced with available resources, 
normally choose enforcement priorities that accord with public 
preferences (or at least the preferences of their constituents). Yet one 
cost of doing so may be to relieve pressure on Congress to adjust laws 
that accord poorly with current preferences. 
 More overt and specific nonenforcement policies, such as the cur-
rent marijuana and immigration initiatives, might implicate the same 
troubling dynamics to an even greater degree. To begin with, as a 
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general matter, weakened expectations of executive enforcement might 
reduce incentives for lawmakers to undertake the hard bargains and 
difficult votes that are often necessary to enact significant legislation. 
Why vote for the bad side of a legislative bargain if a future President 
may cancel the good side through nonenforcement? With respect to any 
given law, moreover, while executive action may provide a short-term 
outlet for political pressures for legal change, precisely by doing so 
executive action may weaken pressure on Congress to enact legislative 
reforms. Yet executive relief is a fragile achievement: Especially when 
it takes forms that do not require notice and comment or other 
procedural formalities, it can be undone with the stroke of a future 
President’s pen. In contrast, undoing legislative change requires further 
legislative change, with all the attendant difficulties of bicameralism 
and presentment and multiple veto gates to enable opposition. 
Precisely how these dynamics play out with respect to any given 
law may well vary with the politics of each particular issue. The politics 
surrounding marijuana and immigration, the two most significant 
nonenforcement initiatives of the Obama Administration, remain 
volatile. It seems doubtful that the public today would support either 
rigorous federal marijuana penalties or removal of all the country’s 
eleven million undocumented immigrants, though formal statutory 
policies call for both those actions.135 For that reason, low-level 
marijuana enforcement and removal of law-abiding immigrants have 
long been low priorities for federal enforcement. Yet it remains to be 
seen whether the administration’s more definite nonenforcement 
initiatives in these areas will hinder or hasten more meaningful 
legislative change. 
With respect to marijuana, as broad political support for medical 
use at the state level has emerged, Congress enacted a recent 
appropriations rider barring use of Justice Department funds “to 
prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that 
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical 
marijuana.”136 Congress, however, has yet to adopt statutory reforms, 
nor has it validated administration policy with respect to recreational 
 
135. See Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., 
GALLUP (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majority-
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19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-reform/nbc-
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(reporting poll finding that “a majority of Americans (57 percent) favoring 
a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, and that 
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requires paying fines and back taxes, as well as passing a security 
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136. Pub. L. No. 113-235, tit. II, § 538 (2015). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Politics of Nonenforcement 
1148 
marijuana.137 On immigration, Republicans remain divided over the 
appropriate response to the President’s action; but despite strong 
popular support for changes to immigration law,138 comprehensive 
legislative reform at least seems unlikely in the short term.139 In both 
cases, executive action in the long run may help entrench constituencies 
favoring change: profitable marijuana businesses now have a vested 
interest in advocating reform, and the deferred action programs will 
only strengthen the economic integration and community ties of 
undocumented immigrants who benefit. At least in the immigration 
context, however, executive action has also provoked intense political 
opposition to legislative change. 
President Reagan’s experience with environmental deregulation 
offers a thought-provoking, if imperfect, historical analogy. As one 
historian explains, while “legislation passed since the late 1960s had 
represented a bipartisan consensus that stressed, on the one hand, ever 
greater regulation, and, on the other, increasing conservation,” 
President Reagan “sought to move government in a different 
direction.”140 Yet the choice to pursue this objective through aggressive 
executive action, rather than legislative reform (or even more modest 
administrative action), proved counterproductive. After stagnating in 
the 1970s, membership in environmental organizations, and the 
resulting political pressure on Congress, spiked in response to such 
controversial executive actions as the elimination of the EPA’s 
enforcement office.141 The president capitulated to demands for more 
robust enforcement; environmental concern became a more strongly 
partisan issue; and deregulatory environmental legislation, to the extent  
137. See Evan Halper, Congress Quietly Ends Federal Government’s Ban on 
Medical Marijuana, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com 
/nation/la-na-medical-pot-20141216-story.html (“Even as Congress has 
shifted ground on medical marijuana, lawmakers remain uneasy about full 
legalization.”). 
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move-immigration-reform-early (describing incoming House Judiciary 
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challenging President Obama’s executive action to grant millions of 
undocumented workers temporary legal status and moving bills that 
passed in his committee last Congress”); Paul Waldman, Why the GOP 
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31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/12 
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it was ever feasible, became impossible.142 One commentator summed 
up the lessons: “There is a price to pay for inattention to legislative 
change . . . subsequent administrations can more easily reverse policies 
pursued through administrative action alone.”143 
Current debates over immigration and marijuana may differ from 
these Reagan-era controversies insofar as President Obama’s actions, 
unlike Reagan’s, align with majority public preferences. It is also 
possible that Congress will respond to recent initiatives, as it did to 
deregulatory initiatives of the Reagan era, by enacting more specific 
enforcement mandates or relying more heavily on private enforcement 
to achieve policy objectives.144 Yet President Reagan’s experience at 
least illustrates how the short-run benefits of executive action for a 
President’s constituents may sometimes come at the long-run cost of 
impeding more significant legislative changes. To the extent that is 
true, maintaining a strong sense of executive obligation to enforce laws, 
whether or not the President agrees with them, may not only be most 
consistent with the formal constitutional structure but might also stand 
the best chance of giving us a sensible, responsive set of laws in the 
long run. 
Conclusion 
The politics of nonenforcement have shifted in recent decades along 
with partisan shifts in control of the White House. This reality should 
encourage a search for enforcement norms with some basis beyond the 
politics of the moment. Building on previous work analyzing 
constitutional principles of executive enforcement discretion, this brief 
symposium article has reflected on possible criteria for evaluating 
faithful execution and potential practical benefits of maintaining strong 
norms of executive enforcement obligation. Our polarized, gridlocked 
political system will no doubt continue to place pressure on presidents 
to address constituent demands through executive action, including 
exercises of nonenforcement. But now that nonenforcement’s potential 
for both parties is plain, we may hope that each side considers carefully 
the precedents it sets. 
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